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The Effect of Recent Statutory Changes in Minnesota
on the Taxation of Property Transfers Upon
Dissolution of Marriage*
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the rule of United States v. Davis,' a property trans-
fer between spouses upon dissolution of their marriage is
treated as a taxable event unless the property distribution is an
equal division of co-owned property. State law controls the
question of whether a transfer is a division of co-owned prop-
erty (nontaxable) or an exchange of one spouse's property for
the relinquishment of the other's marital rights (taxable).2 The
tax consequences can be substantial when all marital property
is held by one spouse or when property that has greatly appre-
ciated in value is transferred.
In Minnesota, transfers of separately held marital property
have always been considered taxable exchanges under the Da-
vis rule.3 In 1978, however, the Minnesota Legislature adopted
several amendments to the marriage dissolution statutes that
give spouses substantial ownership interests in all property ac-
quired during the marriage, regardless of which spouse is the
title holder. This Note will examine the current scope of
spousal rights in marital property under Minnesota law, and
* By Victoria A. Sandberg; J.D., University of Minnesota, 1980. This
article is based upon a paper presented to a taxation seminar at the University
of Minnesota Law School.
1. 370 U.S. 65 (1962). For detailed analyses of the Davis rule, see Alcott,
Selected Tax Problems in Matrimonial Disputes and Settlements, 37 N.Y.U.
INST. FED. TAX. § 33.04 (1979); DuCanto, Federal Tax Law: Where You Divorce
Does Make A Difference, 9 Loy. Cm. LU. 397 (1978); Note, Should Federal In-
come Tax Consequences of Divorce Depend on State Property Law?, 49 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1401 (1976); Comment, The Federal Income Tax Consequences of Prop-
erty Settlements in Common Law States and Under the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act: A Proposal, 29 ME. L. REv. 73 (1977); Comment, Transfer of Appre-
elated Property Pursuant to Divorce: Taxable Event in Oregon?, 53 OP. U REv.
544 (1974).
2. See 370 U.S. at 70.
3. See Lokken, Tax Planning for Divorce, 42 HENNEPiN LAw. 4 (Mar.-Apr.
1979); Tax Gamesmanship in Marriage Dissolutions, 35 BENCH & B. MINN. 25
(Mar. 1979).
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will consider whether property transfers between spouses
should now be treated as nontaxable divisions of co-owned
property under the Davis rule. The Note concludes that al-
though further legislative clarification is desirable, Minnesota
spouses should be considered co-owners of marital property.
Thus, transfers between spouses that effect an equal division of
marital property should be held nontaxable.
II. BACKGROIUND-DAVISAND ITS PROGENY
Under Davis, spousal ownership interests are defined by
state property law4 and an equal division of co-owned property
is not a taxable event.5 Thus, in a community property state,
an equal division of community property is nontaxable. 6 Simi-
larly, in common law states, an equal division of property held
in a traditional form of joint ownership is also tax-free.7 If mar-
4. See 370 U.S. at 70. If a state's highest court has ruled on this issue, the
decision is binding on a federal court that later considers the taxability of the
transfer. Determinations by lower state courts are not binding, but federal
courts must apply what they find to be state law after giving proper regard to
such rulings. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 457
(1967); Kraut v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 740, 741 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Collins v.
Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290, 294 (Okla. 1968). The United States Tax Court, the
Internal Revenue Service, and the federal courts have all indicated a willing-
ness to grant favorable tax treatment to property transfers between spouses
upon a proper showing of co-ownership under state law. See Wallace v. United
States, 439 F.2d 757, 760 (8th Cir. 1971); McKinney v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 263,
267 (1975); Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26, at 27.
5. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B.*26, at 27.
6. See Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213, at 213. An unequal division of com-
munity property, however, may result in taxable gain. Cf. Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-
2 C.B. 26, at 27 (unequal divison of jointly held property in a common law
state). See also Vaughan, Divorce and Taxes: Significant Recent Develop-
ments, 40 TEx. B.J. 947 (1977) (effect of Rev. Rul. 74-347 on unequal division of
community property). Moreover, an award of community property to one
spouse accompanied by the receiving spouse's payment is treated as a
purchase of the transferor's interest in the community property and is a taxa-
ble event. See May v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (P-H) 74,054 (1974). But see
Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213, at 214 (transfer of note in small amount by one
spouse to the other to equalize division of the community property held de min-
imus-no resulting taxable gain).
7. See Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26, at 26. The traditional forms of joint
ownership are joint tenancy, tenancy in common, and tenancy by the entirety.
Id. See, e.g., Beth W. Corp. v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D. Fla. 1972);
Pokusa v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 434 (1978). Cf. Forbes v. United
States, 472 F. Supp. 840 (D. Mass. 1979) (an equal division of property held by
tenancy by the entirety in Massachusetts is not a division of co-owned property
because during the marriage the husband maintains complete control of the
property). Minnesota currently recognizes joint tenancies and tenancies in
common, but not tenancies by the entirety. See MANN. STAT. § 500.19(1) (1978).
An unequal division of jointly held property may result in tax liability even if it
is necessary to effect an equal division of all property acquired by the parties
or by either of them during marriage. See Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26, at 27;
accord, Wiles v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255, 257 (10th Cir. 1974).
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ital property is not considered jointly owned under state law,
however, a transfer of separately held property will result in a
tax on the property's appreciation in value, to be paid by the
transferor spouse.8
The basic inquiry under Davis is the extent of a spouse's
ownership interest in property acquired during the marriage
but held in the other spouse's name. The supreme courts of
several common law states have extended co-ownership be-
yond its traditional boundaries, holding that common owner-
ship may arise from statutorily created rights in marital
property.9 This trend favoring co-ownership of marital property
has been based on marriage dissolution statutes that give
spouses substantial, albeit inchoate, interests in marital prop-
erty held by the other spouse. In these jurisdictions, transfers
*of marital property are controlled by the general rule of nontax-
ability applicable in community property states.10
In determining whether dissolution statutes create co-own-
ership interests, courts have considered several factors. For ex-
ample, one factor that is virtually essential to a finding of co-
ownership is that the distribution of marital property under the
statute be mandatory rather than merely permissive or discre-
tionary.l If the statute further defines a special class of mari-
8. See, e.g., Wiles v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255, 258 (10th Cir. 1973) (in-
terpretation of Kansas state law later found erroneous by Kansas Supreme
Court in Cady v. Cady, 224 Kan. 339, 344, 581 P.2d 358, 363 (1978)). Such a trans-
fer is characterized as an exchange of property for the relinquishment of mari-
tal rights. See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. at 73. The value of marital rights
is presumed equal to the value of the property transferred in exchange for their
release. See id. The exchange characterization gives rise to taxable gain under
section 1001 of the Internal Revenue Code if the property has appreciated in
value in the hands of the transferor spouse. The transferee spouse takes a sub-
stituted basis in the property equal to its fair market value on the date of the
transfer. See I.R.C. § 1012. Cf. Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26, at 27-28 (mechan-
ics of computing taxable gain).
9. See Cady v. Cady, 224 Kan. 339, 343-44, 581 P.2d 358, 363 (1978) (holding
erroneous the federal court's construction of Kansas law in Wiles v. Commis-
sioner, 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1974)); In re Questions Concerning Imel v. United
States, 184 Colo. 1, 3-8, 517 P.2d 1331, 1332-35 (1974) (transfer of co-owned prop-
erty later held nontaxable in Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir.
1975)); Collins v. Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290, 295-97 (Okla. 1968) (transfer of co-
owned property later held nontaxable in Collins v. Commissioner [Collins IV],
412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969), rev'g Collins v. Commissioner [Collins I], 388 F.2d
353 (10th Cir. 1968)). See also Kujawinskl v. Kujawinskl, 71 III. 2d 563, 573, 376
N.E.2d 1382, 1386-87 (1978) (suggesting co-ownership under recently amended
statute).
10. See Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26, at 27.
11. To date, all cases holding that spouses are co-owners of marital prop-
erty have been decided under statutes that place a mandatory duty of distribu-
tion on the trial court. See note 9 supra. Cases rejecting claims of co-
ownership have been decided under statutes that merely permit the court to
1980]
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tal property to be distributed upon dissolution, the likelihood of
a finding of co-ownership increases because the composition of
the estate subject to distribution is not left to the court's discre-
tion.12 Similarly, a court will more readily determine that prop-
erty is co-owned if the statute includes a direction to the court
to consider each spouse's contribution to the acquisition of
marital property,13 especially if the statute specifically directs
the court to consider a spouse's contribution as a homemaker.14
Additional evidence of co-ownership may be inferred when
statutes concerning support and maintenance are separate and
distinct from property distribution statutes.15 The time at
which a spouse's interest in marital property vests is immate-
rial so long as the interest vests upon dissolution of the mar-
riage.16
Conversely, courts have determined that some factors mili-
tate against a finding of co-ownership. For example, if a court
is directed by statute to consider the spouses' needs, income,
employability, and length of marriage, the property division
may be construed as a mere substitute for maintenance.17 Sim-
ilarly, if the relative fault of the parties leading up to the disso-
lution can be used as a factor in making the property division, a
court may find such consideration inconsistent with co-owner-
ship. 8
make the distribution. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 70 (1962);
Wallace v. United States, 439 F.2d 757, 760 (8th Cir. 1971); Kraut v. United
States, 316 F. Supp. 740, 741 (E.D. Wis. 1970); McKinney v. Commissioner, 64
T.C. 263, 266 n.3 (1975); Dunn v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 664, 666-67
(1973). Compare Wiles v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255, 257-58 (10th Cir. 1974)
(no co-ownership under mandatory distribution statute) with Cady v. Cady, 244
Kan. 339, 343-44, 581 P.2d 358, 362 (1978) (co-ownership found under mandatory
distribution statute).
12. See Collins v. Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d at 295.
13. Compare Bosch v. United States, 590 F.2d 165, 167-68 (5th Cir. 1979);
Mills v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 608, 617-18 (1970); In re Questions Concerning
Imel v. United States, 184 Colo. at 3-8, 517 P.2d at 1334-35, and Collins v. Tax
Comm'n, 446 P.2d at 295 with Dunn v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 667.
14. See In re Questions Concerning Imel v. United States, 184 Colo. at 3-10,
517 P.2d at 1334-36.
15. See, e.g., Collins v. Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d at 295-96.
16. See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. at 70.
17. See id.; Wallace v. United States, 439 F.2d at 760. But see In re Ques-
tions Concerning Imel v. United States, 184 Colo. at 2, 10, 517 P.2d at 1334-36
(consideration of economic circumstances and amount of separate property re-
tained by each spouse not necessarily fatal to a finding of co-ownership).
Because maintenance is a personal obligation of marriage, property used to
settle such an obligation could not have been co-owned. See notes 37-42 supra
and accompanying text.
18. See Collins v. Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d at 297.
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II. IMPACT OF THE STATUTORY CHANGES IN
MINNESOTA
Under Minnesota law prior to 1979, spouses clearly were
not considered co-owners of property that had been separately
acquired during marriage.19 Upon dissolution, the distribution
of marital property was permissive, consideration of the contri-
bution of one spouse as homemaker was not mandatory, the
property settlement could be made in lieu of alimony, and
there was no presumption that both spouses contributed sub-
stantially to the accumulation of property during marriage.20
The transfer of separately held marital property was thus con-
sidered a taxable exchange of such property for the release of
marital rights.
Most of the statutory changes that took effect in 1979, how-
ever, point toward spousal co-ownership of marital property.
The amended statutes require the court to make a distribution
of marital property,21 implying that both spouses have a strong
interest in or right to such property. The statutes also guaran-
tee a 'just and equitable" distribution,22 strongly suggesting
that a transfer required by the property settlement is not made
in exchange for the release of the transferor's independent le-
gal obligations.23 In other jurisdictions, a statutory duty to
make an equitable distribution of marital property has been
crucial to a finding of co-ownership.24
Additionally, the statutes presume that all property ac-
quired by the parties during their marriage is marital property,
regardless of formal ownership.2 5 Thus, the composition of the
marital estate is not subject to judicial discretion, and title
alone is not a factor on which the court may base its distribu-
19. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
20. See 1974 Minn. Laws, ch. 107, § 22. The statute required only considera-
tion of alimony and support awarded, the manner in which the property was
acquired, and "all the facts and circumstances of the case." Id.
21. See MmAN. STAT. § 518.58 (Supp. 1979).
22. See id.
23. See Collins v. Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d at 296.
24. See note 11 supra.
25. All property acquired during marriage is presumed to be marital prop-
erty regardless of whether title is held individually or by the spouses in a tradi-
tional form of co-ownership. See MwN. STAT. § 518.54(5) (Supp. 1979). The
presumption of marital property may be overcome by a showing that the prop-
erty was "(a) ... acquired as a gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance by a third
party to one but not to the other spouse; (b)... acquired before the marriage;
(c) . . .acquired in exchange for or is the increase in value of property de-
scribed in (a), (b), (d), and (e); (d) ... acquired by a spouse after a decree of
legal separation; or (e) excluded by a valid antenuptial contract." Id.
19801
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tion. This marital property classification does not affect owner-
ship interests in the property during marriage 26 rather, it
creates a contingent interest that vests upon the dissolution of
the marriage. 27
The contribution of each spouse also weighs heavily in the
ultimate property division. There is a statutory presumption
that each spouse has made a substantial contribution to the ac-
quisition of income and property while living together as hus-
band and wife.28 Moreover, the court is specifically directed to
consider the extent of the contribution of each spouse, includ-
ing the contribution of a spouse as homemaker.29 Courts in
other states have tended to recognize a common ownership in-
terest when transfers between spouses have been in recogni-
tion of each spouse's contribution-financial or otherwise-to
the joint estate.30
Moreover, the amended Minnesota dissolution statutes re-
tain separate provisions for support 3' and maintenance,32 dis-
tinct from the distribution of marital property. The personal
obligations of support and maintenance can thus be wholly sat-
isfied outside the property division. Where the obligations are
so satisfied, an equal division of marital property cannot realis-
tically be viewed as an exchange in discharge of the independ-
ent support obligations-such a division is properly
characterized as a distribution of co-owned property.33 Finally,
the amended statutes bar the court from considering fault in
26. See In re Questions Concerning Imel v. United States, 184 Colo. at 8-10,
517 P.2d at 1335-36; Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 111. 2d at 573, 376 N.E.2d at 1386;
Cady v. Cady, 224 Kan. at 344, 581 P.2d at 362-63.
27. Because marital property includes property acquired by either party
during the pendency of the dissolution as well as during the marriage, see note
25 supra, it is possible that spousal interests in marital property do not vest un-
til the entry of a decree of dissolution. See Johnson v. Johnson, 277 N.W.2d 208,
211 (Minn. 1979) (decided prior to the effective date of the 1978 amendments).
But see Cady v. Cady, 224 Kan. at 344, 581 P.2d at 362-63 (1978) (despite statu-
tory language implying that co-ownership rights vested upon entry of a decree
of dissolution, interests held to vest upon filing of the dissolution action).
28. See MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (Supp. 1979).
29. See id.
30. See note 13 supra.
31. See MiNN. STAT. § 518.57 (1978).
32. See MiNN. STAT. § 518.552 (Supp. 1979). Maintenance and the distribu-
tion of marital property have long been recognized as serving entirely different
functions in Minnesota. See, e.g., Warner v. Warner, 219 Minn. 59, 68-70, 17
N.W.2d 58, 63-64 (1944); Anich v. Anich, 217 Minn. 259, 260-61, 14 N.W.2d 289, 290
(1944); Bensel v. Hall, 177 Minn. 178, 178, 181, 255 N.W. 104, 104-06 (1929).
33. See In re Questions Concerning Imel v. United States, 184 Colo. at 10,
517 P.2d at 1335-36. But see Kraut v. United States, 316 F. Supp. at 741 (rejection
of husband's claim that award of maintenance exhausted his independent per-
sonal marital obligations).
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making a property division.34 The removal of this factor from
consideration provides further evidence that spouses should be
regarded as co-owners of their marital property.35
Some elements of the statutes, however, suggest that a
spouse's interest in marital property may not rise to the level of
co-ownership. Most significant is the direction to the court to
consider whether the property division is in lieu of or in addi-
tion to maintenance or support.3 6 This is compounded by the
requirement that each spouse's contributions to the acquisition
of property during marriage be considered in connection with
the maintenance award.37 The resulting interdependence be-
tween the award of maintenance and the distribution of prop-
erty undermines the concept of co-ownership of marital
property.3 8 Although a decision not to award maintenance does
not necessarily mean that spouses cannot be co-owners of their
marital property,39 a property distribution expressly in lieu of
maintenance certainly falls within the cope of the Davis rule
and hence is a taxable event.4 0 The statutory direction to con-
sider factors such as need, income, occupation, employability,
age, and length of marriage is also inconsistent with co-owner-
ship.4 1 Although consideration of these factors is not fatal to a
finding of co-ownership, courts may reject co-ownership claims
when these discretionary factors outweigh the "mandatory dis-
tribution" elements in the overall statutory formulation.4 2
Perhaps the most compelling evidence of co-ownership
34. See MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (Supp. 1979).
35. See Collins v. Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d at 295.
36. See MiNN. STAT. § 518.58 (Supp. 1979).
37. See MiN. STAT. § 518.552(2) (g) (Supp. 1979).
38. Under the current statutes, a distribution of property could be in par-
tial or total satisfaction of the personal obligations of support and maintenance.
See MmN. STAT. § 518.58 (Supp. 1979). This distorts the historical concept of
maintenance as a personal duty of support that is separate and distinct from
divisions of property held at the time of dissolution. See generally cases cited
in note 32 supra.
39. The absence of an award of maintenance under such circumstances
should not support the inference that the property was transferred in exchange
for the spouse's release of the right to maintenance. See In re Questions Con-
cerning Imel v. United States, 184 Colo. at 8, 10, 517 P.2d at 1335-36. Moreover,
upon receipt of a just and equitable share of marital property, a spouse may
not have a need for maintenance.
40. See note 17 supra.
41. See lum. STAT. § 518.58 (Supp. 1979). Other factors to be considered
are any prior marriages of the parties and each party's health, station, voca-
tional skills, estate, liabilities, and opportunity for future acquisition of capital
assets. Id.
42. See e.g., Wallace v. United States, 439 F.2d at 760-61; Kraut v. United
States, 316 F. Supp. at 741.
1980]
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rights in Minnesota is the treatment of marital property settle-
ments under the state income tax laws. Gross income includes,
inter alia, gains or profits derived from every "disposition of'
or "dealing in" property.43 However, the amount of any gain
recognized upon a transfer of property to the spouse or former
spouse of the taxpayer in exchange for the release of the
spouse's marital rights is excluded from state gross income.44
The obvious inference is that the state legislature does not con-
sider such a transfer to be a "disposition of" or "dealing in"
property, but rather a mere nontaxable division of property be-
tween two people with common rights of ownership. Although
the statutory language appears to acknowledge that such trans-
fers could be in exchange for the release of marital rights, it is
more likely that this language was used only in an effort to
identify, by convenient reference to a previously accepted fed-
eral characterization, those transfers qualifying for exclusion.45
Thus, although there is some basis in the current statutes
for rejecting a claim of spousal co-ownership of marital prop-
erty, the better reasoned and more compelling conclusion is
that the statutes as a whole create a species of co-ownership
that vests upon the dissolution of marriage. Such a construc-
tion is also more equitable, putting Minnesota taxpayers on a
par with those in community property states and a growing
number of common law states where transfers between
spouses effecting an equal division of marital property are tax-
free. Litigation of this issue deserves serious consideration, es-
pecially because the Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet ad-
dressed the extent of a spouse's interest in marital property
held by the other spouse.4 6 A determination of co-ownership
would be most probable if a trial court expressly found that the
43. MiNN. STAT. § 290.01(20) (Supp. 1979).
44. See 1980 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. (West) 1050 (amending MINN. STAT.
§ 290.01(20) (b) (8) (Supp. 1979)).
45. The starting point for determining state gross income is federal ad-
justed gross income. See MumN. STAT. § 290.01(20) (Supp. 1979). Since gains on
property transfers incident to marriage dissolution have been thought to be in-
cludable in federal gross income under the Davis rule, a reference to the fed-
eral characterization of these transfers is necessary to identify the excluded
gain and should not be interpreted as an acceptance of that characterization by
the state legislature. Indeed, the very purpose of this statutory section is to en-
sure that such transfers are not treated as taxable gain.
46. There is no need to wait for a Minnesota Supreme Court determination
under the newly amended dissolution statutes before litigating; if the case is a
federal one the question can be certified to the Minnesota Supreme Court
under MIN. STAT. § 480.061 (1978). The supreme court's finding will then be
binding on the federal court considering the taxability of the transfer under the
federal income tax statutes. See note 4 supra.
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property division was based on the spouses' relative contribu-
tions to the acquisition of property during marriage and that
the property distribution was wholly separate from any award
or denial of maintenance. 47
Alternatively, the Minnesota Legislature could remove all
doubts on this issue by further amending4 8 the marriage disso-
lution statutes. Under any such amendments, the distribution
of marital property should be based solely on the spouses' rela-
tive contributions, financial or otherwise, to the acquisition of
marital property,4 9 and the amended statutes should continue
the presumption of substantial contribution on the part of each
spouse.5 0 Consideration of such factors as need, income, em-
ployability, and length of marriage is properly the exclusive
province of the maintenance inquiry and should be removed as
a factor affecting the property settlement. Finally, the legisla-
ture should omit all reference to contribution from the statute
governing maintenance awards.
IV. CONCLUSION
Prior to 1979, a transfer of appreciated property between
spouses in Minnesota was clearly a taxable event under the Da-
vis rule. Amendments to the marriage dissolution statutes and
the state income tax statutes in 1978 and 1979, however, give
both spouses substantial rights in property acquired during
marriage but held by one spouse. Under the new laws, the
composition of the marital estate subject to distribution is fixed
by statute, and each spouse is presumed to have made a sub-
47. See, e.g., In re Questions Concerning Imel v. United States, 184 Colo. at
8, 517 P.2d at 1335. Consider, too, the possibility of varying degrees of common
ownership, depending on the extent of contribution. Although such a rule
might be workable, it would present substantial problems of proof at the trial
level A uniform rule of statutorily created equal ownership in marital property
would be preferable.
48. The Kansas Legislature recently acted to ensure tax-free marital prop-
erty settlements in that state. See KAN STAT. ANN. 23-201 (Supp. 1979). The
statute provides in pertinent part-
(b) Each spouse has a common ownership in maital property which
vests not later than the time of commencement by one spouse against
the other of an action in which a final decree is entered for divorce,
separate maintenance, or annulment, the extent of the vested interest
to be determined and finalized by the court pursuant to K.S.A. 1978
Supp. 60-160, and any amendments thereto.
This amendment was not necessary, however, because the Kansas Supreme
Court had ruled that common ownership was created by the dissolution statute
prior to its amendment. See Cady v. Cady, 224 Kan. at 346, 581 P.2d at 363.
49. See notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text.
50. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
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stantial contribution to the acquisition of all marital property.
The court must make a just and equitable distribution of mari-
tal property in light of, inter alia, each spouse's contribution,
including the contribution of the spouse as homemaker, and
personal obligations can be completely satisfied through
awards of support and maintenance wholly outside the prop-
erty settlement. Any gain recognized on transfers between par-
ties to a marriage dissolution is now excluded from state gross
income.
Taken as a whole, these statutory changes present a strong
argument that spouses hold a common ownership interest in
marital property that vests upon the dissolution of marriage.
Thus, transfers of separately held property between parties to a
marriage dissolution in Minnesota may no longer be taxable
under the Davis rule.
Although such a co-ownership interest could be unequivo-
cally established by further statutory amendments clarifying
spousal interests in marital property, judicial recognition of
common ownership under the current statutes is nonetheless
likely. A favorable resolution of this issue would inure to the
benefit of Minnesota residents who face marriage dissolution
under the recently amended statutes, and would bring Minne-
sota in line with other common law states,1 that have recog-
nized that similar marriage dissolution statutes create co-
ownership interests.
51. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
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